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THE PROBLEM OF TIME IN LIGHT IN A U G U S T  
by  Carolyn Porter 
Light in August opens with Lena Grove sitting in a ditch waiting for 
Armstid's wagon to reach her. In three pages we survey her whole history 
and return to the present moment of the wagon's approach: 
The sharp and brittle crack and clatter of its weathered and ungreased wood and metal 
IS slow and terrdtc. a series of dry sluggish reports carrylng for a half mile across the hot 
still plnewlney sllence of the August afternoon. Though the mules plod In a steady and 
unflagging hypnosis, the vehicle does not seem to  progress. It seems to hang suspended 
in the middle distance forever and forever, so ~nflnrteslmal IS its progress, l ~ k e  a shabby 
bead upon the mild red string of road.' 
Faulkner goes on to  extend and amplify the sense of time as both fluid and 
static. And in a seamless revery, Lena anticipates the future, recalls the past, 
and luxuriates in the present. Time seems to slow down, to approach but 
never quite to reach immobility. A hypnotic stillness envelops the "clatter" 
of the wagon as it approaches the waiting figure. The wagon's movement is 
evidenced by its sound but contradicted by its appearance, "suspended in 
the middle distance forever and forever." The familiar Faulknerian contra- 
dictions-motion and stasis, past and present, coexisting in an elongated 
moment-exemplify the language for which Faulkner has been both praised 
and damned.? 
While the tensions between motion and stasis, past and present, have 
been noted to occur pervasively and offered as evidence for Faulkner's 
"failure" to resolve the very issues his novels develop,3 and while debate 
continues as to whether his time is continuous or characteristically discon- 
tinuous,4 we still have no adequate explanation for Faulkner's practice. I 
think, however, that we can approach the problem by defining a fundamental 
tension in Light in August. On the one hand, Faulkner fragments, distorts, 
and juxtaposes various time intervals, reconstituting past, present, and 
future into a newly ordered whole, so that events come to us not chrono- 
logically, but according to a principle of related meanings. Such is the 
principle of order in Light in August, where large chunks of the past are 
interpolated into the present and three separate stories are juxtaposed. On the 
other hand, Faulkner seems intent on sustaining the flow of time, not through 
a series of chronological events, but through a language which registers the 
Miss Porter IS Assistant Professor of Engl~sh at the Univers~ty of Cal~fornla t Berkeley. 
107 
108 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
relentless movement of creatures in a world marked by ceaseless progression. 
From this perspective, Faulkner's world is fundamentally in motion and it 
is its very motion which makes it endure. Lena Grove, despite her single- 
minded and limited nature, persists; and she persists in motion, into and out 
of Jefferson, to begin and end the novel. Thus, time as segmented and re- 
shuffled into a re-ordered whole, and time a s  the duration sustaining life, 
both operate in L~ght  in August. And the tension between continuity and 
discontinuity, grounded in the effort to structure time and the need to 
respect its endless flow, informs both the novel's meaning and its structure. 
The spatialization of time allows Faulkner to slow it down, speed it up, 
fragment and reassemble it, even to halt it tenuously; but the sense of dura- 
tion endows these spatialized and distorted fragments with the basic con- 
tinuity which welds them together. This tension operates at several levels: 
it infuses the language with its peculiar energy, it helps to define character, 
and it makes possible the structural and thematic integrity of the novel as a 
whole. However, before approaching that novel, we need to develop a firm 
notion of what is implied by time as duration. 
Faulkner's affinity to  Bergson is greater than we have realized.5 Bergson 
develops a metaphysics of time; his fundamental insights derive from his 
notion that our habitual spatialization of time should be distinguished from 
the real duration in which we live. For Bergson, intelligence constitutes one 
function of the human mind, and intuition another complementary one. 
Intelligence is the faculty which enables us to  act o n  our environment by 
focusing on only those aspects of it which we can use. Intelligence allows us 
to  see things as static in order to  organize them for our practical and intel- 
lectual purposes. Intuition, on the other hand, begins with the perception of 
movement and sees immobility as only an abstract moment, "a snapshot 
taken by our mind,""ntelligence operates o n  the principle of "virtual action" 
which dictates that it extract from perception the information it needs to act 
(p. 68). It breaks up time into minutes, hours, and days so as to  order the. 
world for efficient use. Intuition, however, grasps "a succession which is 
not juxtaposition, a growth from within, the uninterrupted prolongation of 
the past into a present which is already blending into the future" (p. 35). This 
indivisible flow of time Bergson calls duration. In trying to  represent this 
duration, all we can d o  is conjure up metaphors, like the one Bergson uses 
of beads lined u p  on a thread. The beads represent successive states and the 
thread is a n  inadequate emblem for duration (p. 83). Duration is something 
we intuit and cannot adequately articulate because the tools of language are 
all forged by the intelligence and derive ultimately from a spatialization of 
the external world. Further, this ceaseless flux is endowed with a11 the reality, 
all the positive values of Plato's world of Ideas. Duration is not only change, 
but constant, indivisible, indestructible change. For Plato, the world of 
becoming was by definition unreal. If Being is given once and for all in the 
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immutable system of Ideas, then the world of flux unfolding before us can 
add nothing to it; it can only constitute a "diminution" and "degradation" 
of it (p. 123). But once we note that change itself is constant, we can view it 
as duration and posit it as the fundamental ground of being, providing for 
sustenance and growth. 
Bergson applies the notion of duration to the solution of a variety of 
philosophical problems, whose complexity would take us far afield. But his 
discussion of memory and freedom is of particular relevance to both an 
understanding of duration itself and its role in Faulkner's fictional world. 
According to Bergson, the "past . . . is necessarily automatically preserved" 
(p. 162). The present is a "certain interval of duration" like a sentence now 
being pronounced. Our attention spans the interval defined by the sentence, 
which can be elongated or shortened, "like the interval between the two 
points of a compass." The interval represented by one sentence can be 
stretched to include two by a change in punctuation. Accordingly, "an 
attention which could be extended indefinitely would embrace, along with 
the preceding sentence, all the anterior phrases of the lecture and the events 
which preceded the lecture, and as large a portion of what we call our past 
as desired" (pp. 178-179). The present, therefore, is a function of the extent 
of our "attention to life" (p. 179). The distinction between the present and 
the past is a result of our apparent inability to sustain that attention. The 
present becomes past only when it no longer commands our immediate 
interest. In other words, if we did not have to  channel our attention toward 
the future, if our "attention to life" were not repeatedly interrupted by the 
urgencies dictated by the practical concern of accomplishing our particular 
ends, our present would include our "entire past history. . . not as instanta- 
neity, not like a cluster of simultaneous parts, but as something continually 
present which would also be something continually moving" (p. 180). We 
forget events in the past as long as they have no bearing on our immediate 
concerns. But a radical alteration of our orientation toward the future, such 
as that presented by the threat of sudden death, can effect a loss of interest 
in the necessities of action and restore that "attention to life" which allows 
the past to flow into the present as an indivisible part of it. Thus we would 
live in a "perpetual present" which is like a melody and has "nothing in 
common with immutability, or . . . with instantaneity. What we have is a 
present which endures" (p. 180). 
Perhaps the most attractive feature of Bergson's metaphysic is the freedom 
it bestows on all organic life and particularly on human consciousness. We 
exist "in a concrete duration where the idea of necessary determination 
loses all significance, since in it the past becomes identical with the present 
and continuously creates with it-if only by the fact of being added to it- 
something absolutely new" (pp. 184-1 85). Perpetually exfoliating unfore- 
seeable forms of life, duration endows us with freedom not as a system of 
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choices, but as a n  open-ended growth which is never completed. Events d o  
not emerge in two stages first a s  possible and then as actual. "The possible 
is . . . the real with the addition of an  act of mind which throws its image 
back into the past, once it has been enacted" (p. 118). "The possible is [a] 
mirage of the present in the past" (p. 119). Consequently, the fact that we can 
look back into the past and find conditions of possibility for the present 
situation does not imply that  those conditions necessarily and inevitably 
produced the present. We remodel the past in the act of finding causal ante- 
cedents to explain the present, just as we recall from our  own past only those 
events which assist us in ou r  immediate enterprise of coping with the future. 
But in neither case does the past pre-exist as a system of possible options; 
only in retrospect and in the service of our  present needs and interests does 
the past organize itseif into relationships. 
Bergson, then, sees us as cut off from real duration by our habitual need 
to spatialize time. Our  problems derive not from the failure to escape time, 
but from our inability to penetrate it. Yet this is only an  artificial inability 
arising from the intellectual disposit~on to hyposta t i~e  instants of duration 
in order to act in the external world. We all experience duration intuitively 
as the ongoing movement of our  world. Bergson views this very persistence 
of life, manifesting itself in ceaseless change, a s  the ground of being and the 
insurance of freedom. All ou r  efforts to spat ia l i~e  time, to order and regulate 
and abstract from the change within which we exist, are fabricated structures 
manufactured in the service of utility and necessary to our survival, but 
ultimately unrelated to  our  endurance. We survive by organi7ing our environ- 
ment so  that it will serve our needs, but our  endurance is bound up with 
the duration which underlies and sustains our very continuity with the world 
of living beings. 
What is remarkable about Bergson's discussion of duration is his apparent 
inability to recognize the urgency implicit in our  fabrications. By referring 
ail human effort t o  organize and spatialize time to a n  intellectual faculty 
whose function is basically utilitarian, Bergson fails to account fully for the 
human need underlying the intellectual enterprise whose dimensions he so  
readily circumscribes. While intuition may put ~ t s  in touch with duration, 
surely what it discovers there is not wholly attractive. Ceaseless change, 
while it endows life with freedom and continuity, nonetheless compels us to 
order it in the effort t o  create a distinctively human meaning. Bergson's 
notion of intuition is his way of humanizing duration, but history would 
lead us to  believe that further humanization is necessary. 
According to  Frank Kermode, who is fundamentally concerned with this 
urge to order as it manifests itself in fictions, men are thrust into the world 
in medias res, and so  make "imaginative investments in coherent patterns 
which, by the provision of a n  end, make possible a satisfying consonance 
with the origins and with the middle."' Characteristically, these patterns 
T H E  PROBLEM OF TIME IN I * I G H T / N  AUGUST I 1  1 
inform time with meaning by circumscribing it within an  interval and or- 
ganizing it around a kairos, a moment in time filled with significance, whose 
paradigm is the Incarnation. Fictions, then, perform a larger task than 
Bergson's "fabrications"; fictions not only enable man to act, but attempt to 
inform his acts with meaning. The simple fiction of clock time is Kermode's 
model for the plots we impose on pure duration in the effort to order it and 
so make meaning of it (pp. 44-45). But in between the tick-tock, the ordered 
interval, comes the tock-tick of pure successiveness, and as our fictions 
grow more complex they attempt to  accommodate this tock-tick of un- 
humanized duration into a larger fiction which will invest it with meaning. 
Moreover, the more thoroughgoing our acceptance of time as ceaseless and 
endless, the more complex and urgent are our attempts to  appropriate it 
within a fiction. (Bergson's duration is necessarily endless, since perpetual 
growth is open-ended, constantly creating unforeseeable forms. The time 
between tock and tick is that time which repels our effort to circumscribe it 
within a n  ordered interval.) What our fictions represent, then, is a funda- 
mental commitment to  order and to the spatialization of time such order 
entails. 
Accordingly, we are confronted with a dilemma. Compelled to order our 
world, we necessarily impose patterns on it which provide meaning and 
allow us to survive, not only physically, but intellectually and even spiritually. 
Yet the very order we construct and the meaning we thereby create are 
inadequate becausethey limit our freedom and cut us off from the continuity, 
indeed the communality, of life. By imposing a plot o n  time, we are  consoled 
because we know where we are  going and from whence we came, but this 
knowledge also restricts our movement to  a predetermined course. On the 
other hand, t o  live in pure duration, even with the consolations of freedom 
and continuity, is to  deny our fundamental need for consonance. In Faulk- 
ner's world, this dilemma makes itself felt in the tension reflected in the 
order the novel struggles to  create out of its disparate fragments and the 
pure duration its language attempts to  sustain, the tension betwecn the 
ceaseless motion its characters variously enact and the elusive meaning they 
try and fail t o  discover. 
If we return now to  Lena Grove watching the wagon approaching her, the 
tension I have been defining can be seen in operation. The paragraph as a 
whole defines aninterval of duration in which Lena enacts the "attention to  
life" Bergson describes. The "slow and terrific" sound of the wagon moving 
vivifies our sense of ceaseless motion, sIightly astonishing in its very "steady 
and unflagging" progress up the hill. Lena knows the wagon is coming closer 
because she hears "the sharp and brittle crack and clatter of its weathered 
and ungreased wood and metal," even though "it seems to hang suspended 
in the middle distance forever and forever" (p. 7). The apparent contradiction 
of motion and stasis is resolved if we view the image of permanent suspcn- 
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sion as Faulkner's means of creating the impression of constant change. The 
sound ofthe wagon assures us of its movement, while its appearance provides 
it with an aura of constancy. Faulkner is appealing t o  our predisposition to 
view immobility as permanence, but complicating our response by attributing 
that permanence to  motion itself. Sound is consistently allied with motion 
in the novel, as we shall see, and it is with the sound of the wagon that Lena 
allies herself. The wagon as "shabby bead" fades into an  image of the road 
as a "measured thread being rewound onto a spool," but both images give 
way "at last" to the sense that the "sound" of the wagon "seems to come slow 
and terrific and without meaning, as though it were a ghost travelling a half 
mile ahead of its own shape" (p. 7). The thread-spool image limits and de- 
termines the motion of life, while the auditory image evokes a world without 
beginning or end, a world in constant motion. Noting that the wagon's 
sound is a "half mile" ahead of its appearance, Lena envisions herself as 
already on the wagon, "thinking then it will he as ij 1 were riding /or a ha(/ 
mile hefire I even got into the   jag on" (p. 7).  Having incorporated the past 
into the present, she immediately stretches her attention span to include 
what we would normally caIl her future-her sense of being on the wagon 
and even of having been on it. Lena's present, in fact, is perpetual, for she 
can also think of other wagons in the past without any shift of attention. 
From 'now,' to being on and off the wagon, to  questions she has asked 
strangers all along the road, and finally to her anticipated reunion with 
Lucas Burch, Lena's mind "goes idle and swift and smooth" because her 
attention to life, like the ceaseless motion around her, while minimal, is 
constant (p. 8). 
Perhaps the most vivid image of Lena's temporal habitat comes with the 
description of her advancing 
In  dentt teal and anonymous and deltberate wagons a5 though through a succes\~on of  
creakwheeled and ltmpeared avatars, 11ke aomethlng movtng forever and wtthout progres5 
>tcro\\ an urn ( f '  6 )  
The urn offers Faulkner, as it did Keats, an image of motion in stasis. The 
word avatar is used repeatedly to  imply the successive versions of a person 
or object hypostatized into successive instants. Like the frames of a film, 
avatars constitute the static images we would see if the film ever stopped. 
But Lena is moving "through" these avatars. Accordingly, the wagons to 
which the term avatars refers are presented as only artificially distinct from 
each other and the road down which they move. Each is not only a version 
of all the others, "identical and anonymous and deliberate," but all are 
simply metaphorsfor the motion they embody (p. 6). 
Lena Grove is ensconced in duration as no one else in the novel can be, for 
she is a woman fundamentally unconscious of the horror implicit in her 
world. The contingencies faced by Mrs. Armstid are totally alien to  Lena, 
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because she does not regard the future as built up block by block out of the 
possibilities inhering in a problematic and distinct present, nor does she 
separate that present from the past as effect and cause. Lena's "tranquil and 
calm unreason and detachment" endow her with the capacity to  exist in the 
extended interval of a perpetuat present (p. 16). Her attention to  life is never 
broken by the need to  shift her interest from one concern to  another, from 
the demands of the present moment to the encroaching problems of the next. 
Even when the baby inside her kicks, causing a spasm of pain, "time has not 
stopped," because Lena's time is continuous and indivisible into past, present, 
and future (p. 25). 
Lena's immersion in duration is, however, a mixed blessing. She is endowed 
with thestrength and health to persist against what appear as insurmountable 
odds. Born in abject poverty, orphaned at  twelve, burdened early in life with 
the responsibilities of caring for her nieces and nephews, seduced and 
abandoned by a scoundrel a t  twenty, she sets out on  a quest t o  find the father 
of the child she tirelessly carries inside her, a quest which takes her on foot 
across two states. The fact that she does catch up  with him testifies to  the 
very persistence and faith implicit in her undertaking. Lena's effort to find 
her unborn child's father and so  to unify and solidify her family reflects her 
fundamental devotion to community. As a child riding to  town in her 
father's wagon, she preferred to  walk upon her arrival in town s o  as to  feel 
herself part of the community. More important, Lena creates a community 
wherever she is by eliciting from everyone she meets a comn~una l  and 
humane response. Mrs. Armstid, outraged a t  Lena's naivetC, nonetheless 
gives her the small savings she has gleaned from her private egg enterprise. 
Mr. Armstid and countless others pick her up and meet her immediate needs. 
The sheriff refuses to evict her from Joe's cabin. And Byron, of course, does 
her the timely favor of falling in love with her. Lena's communality arises 
from her sense of continuity and relatedness with all people, her fundamental 
participation in the ongoing duration of life. Finally, Lena, carrying her 
heavy burden of potential life within her, serves as a principle of fecundity 
in the novel; she is the woman whose child raises in Gail Hightower's ears 
"the treble shouts of the generations" (p. 357). With her health and strength, 
her devotion tocommunity, and her capacity to add to the earth's abundance, 
she is committed to life-not as a future possibility no r  as a past poten- 
tiality -but as a perpetually present reality. 
However, Lena's posture toward the world is not, finally, adequate to us 
as readers. Lena offers a severely limited response to the contingencies 
LLS never en- among which she moves. The fact that she and J o e  Christmc , 
counter one another serves to reflect Lena's fundamental unawareness of 
the tragicdimension he embodies. The one occasion on which she is exposed 
to Joe's world is also the one occasion o n  which she cannot cope with her 
experience-when Mrs. Hines confuses her newborn son with Joe. Lena can 
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endure Lucas Burch's final and pitiful perfor~ilance without losing her 
balance in the least, but Mrs. Hines's odd behavior poses a threat to  her 
stability. While Lena evokes humane responses from everyone she en- 
counters (except Lucas Burch, from whom a humane response is probably 
~mposs~b le ) ,  her own human~ty  is limited by her unacknowledged demands 
on those around her; Lena's reliance on others may grow out of tlie catalytic 
cffect by which her presence seems to create a community, but it takes only 
a slight shift of perspective to see that reliance as real dependence. The 
most compelling aspect of Lena's inadeq~iacy as  a ftill human being, however, 
is her virtual lack of intelligence. Lena functions as totally by intuition and 
without intelligence, in Bergson's sense of those terms, as it is possible to 
d o  and still be human. Almost bovine in her intellectual stance, Lena comes 
to  us as a severcly limited creature, whose health, communal impulses, and 
fertility seem available only at  the cost of physical dependency and intcl- 
lectual vacuity. 
Like Lena Grove, J o e  Christmas is constantly in motion, but with an  
obvious and decisive difference. Cut off from the pure duration in which 
Lena lives, Joe  is the victim of compulsive motion. Alienated from both 
black and white societies, Joe  can avail himself of neither the consolations 
of duration nor the consonance of a meaningfully ordered temporal structure. 
In the opening pages of the large central chunk of the novel wliich is devoted 
to his story, Joe  comes to us as a man disengaged from the "niyriad sounds" 
of "voices . . . trees, darkness, earth; people; his own voice; other voices 
evocative of names and times and places-which he had been consciotis of 
all his life without knowing it, which were his life" (p.  91). The sounds of tlie 
earth beyond his door evoke Joe's response to  a world constantly alive and 
"aloud . . . with crickets . . . fireflies . . . whippoorwills," a response filled 
with the pain of alienatioti: "thinking Gar/ peil~rips rind / l i p  nor krzo\i~rrzg 
that too" (pp. 139, 91). When Joe  first approaches Joanna Burden's house 
he observes that "the crickets, which had ceased as he moved, keeping a 
little island of silence about him like thin yellow shadow of their small voices, 
began again, ceasing again when he moved with that tiny and alert sudden- 
ness" (p. 200). The sounds of these tiny creatures recur throughout the novel 
as an  echo of the vital and sustaining duration of the earth itself, but Joe  
moves among them in an "island of si lence."His disgust at  the con~plex 
fusion of f'emale and Negro, the "womanshenegro," is fundanlentally asso- 
ciatcd with his detachment from the sense of duration which renders Lena 
Grove a principle of fertility (p. 137). J o e  prefers anything masculine to the 
n~ystel-ious presence of woman, a principle which by providing a n  "odor, an  
attenuation, and aftertaste" to his experience, tends to relate him to the 
continuous and abundant fertility by which the earth endures (p. 146). When 
Bobbie tells him that she's "sick tonight" and .Joe runs away into the woods, 
his revulsion at the idea of the nienstrual cycle is reflected in a n  image of "a 
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diminishing row of suavely shaped urns in moonlight, blanched. . . not one 
. . . perfect . . . each one . . . cracked" (pp. 163, 165). Symbols of fecundity, 
the womb-like urns issue "something liquid, deathcolored, and foul" (p. 165). 
Because of his childhood traumatic experience with the dietician, an  experi- 
ence which comes to be fused with his early associations with "nigger," Joe  
is repelled by what he unavoidably views as the foul fact of female sexuality. 
The whole notion of Female is intimately associated with blackness as Joe  
frantically out of the "original quarry, abyss itself' of niggertown, 
where the "fecundmellow voices of negro women murmured" (pp. 102, 101). 
Joe's isolation is grounded in his inability to  relate himself to the ongoing 
duration of the natural world, but it is tragically heightened by the inade- 
quacy of the human structures on the periphery of which he is forced to exist. 
Alienated from both social and natural worlds, Joe  exists in a state of sheer 
c.hronos, a state of constant motion marked only by the passing of minutes, 
hours, days. "Doomed with motion," Joe is totally dependent on the minimal 
structure provided by the clock: "He slept less than two hours. . . . At seven 
o'clock that evening he was in town . . . at nine o'clock he was standing out- 
side the barbershop" (pp. 197, 95, 98). The prose style which Faulkner uses 
to present Joe's actions on the morning of the day he murders Joanna Burden 
reflects, in a manner reminiscent of Hemingway, the sheer successiveness of 
discrete and meaningless time segments whic11characteri7es Joe's motion: 
When he left the cabin it was qurte Irglit. T h e  b r ~ d s  were In full chorus  Thrs trrne he t u ~ n e d  
111s back o n  the house H e  went o n  past the st;tble a n d  er i te~ed the  pn\turc beyond rt Hra 
shoe\ and 111s tlouser legs werc soon sopprng w ~ t l i  gray dew. Hc p a o ~ d  and  rolled hrs 
t rouscr \g~ngci ly  to  111s knecsnnd went on.(l' 96) 
Detached from pure duration, and painfully aware of the inadequacy of 
sheer ci~ronos, Joe is alienated from his own motion, a fact which becomes 
particularly evident at those points when he is able to watch his own physical 
behavior from a distance in "motionless. . . utterly contemplative" moments 
(p. 106). Sitting in the dietician's closet as a child, Joe  seems "to be turned 
in upon himself, watching himself sweating, watching himself smear another 
worm of paste into his mouth which his stomach did not want" (p. 106). 
When McEachern beats him, Joe's body is described as "wood or stone; a 
post or tower upon which the sentient part of him mused like a hermit, 
contemplative and remote with ecstasy and self-crucifixion" (pp. 139-140). 
Sometimes his detachment is accentuated by a difference in velocity between 
his mind's and his body's movement, as in the scene in Bobbie's room after 
everyone but Joe  has departed. Before the "wireends of volition and sen- 
tience" connect, Joe lies watching the events above him unfolding in a kind 
of pure succession, flowing without punctuation until, as the "wireends" 
approach each other, Faulkncr begins to intersperse the events with the 
connective "then" (p. 194). As the prose moves out of italics, "thens" pile 
up, reflecting Joe's increasing ability to distinguish between one moment 
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and the next. Even after volition and sentience reconnect, Joe's mind still 
suffers, moving slower than his body so that "he was in the hall without 
having remembered passing through the door" (p. 194). Finally, after gulp- 
ingdown the whiskey, his mind moves faster than his body, which he has to 
"coax . . . along the hall, sliding it along one wall" (p. 194). Whether body or 
mind moves faster, Joe  watches himself move without cessation. The point 
is that he is always moving, cannot stop moving, but also cannot relate that 
motion coherently to any purpose other than escape until the final stages of 
his flight, when he realizes that he has lived "for thirty years . . . inside an 
orderly parade of named and numbered days like fence pickets" (pp. 289- 
290). 
Eventually, the road runs "so fast that accepting . . . take[s] the place of 
knowing and believing" (p. 155). I t  runs so  fast that Joe  no sooner sees a 
future possibility-"Something is going to happen t o  me, I am going to d o  
something"-than it has virtually become a past fact-"Maybe I have 
already done it" (pp. 91, 97). For Joe, the present constitutes something 
possible, "waiting to be done" because he views the present as already past 
(p. 97). Bergson asserts that viewing the present as a system of possibles 
which anticipate a future reality entails a false determinism in which the 
present is spuriously imprinted with the pattern of a future whose outline is 
unforeseeable, and Joe's predicament embodies precisely that fatalism 
which derives from the act of structuring the present as  if it were past. 
According to Bergson, the possible is a concept applicable only to the past 
wherein we try to  find the causes for the present and so posit sources for that 
present. But when we apply this operation to the relationship between 
present and future, we necessarily fail because the present can only become 
possible from the vantage point of the future. Joe  really has no  present here, 
because he has already imposed on it the pattern which will define the 
future. The contrast between Joe's and Lena's modes of anticipating the 
future is instructive. Lena's future and past are enfolded in a perpetual 
present, out of which she anticipates the future and recalls the past not as 
distinct states, each one causing the next, but a s  the indistinguishable phases 
of a continuous flow. Thus the feeling of being on the wagon, even of having 
been on the wagon, does not disrupt the present, but seems to flow out of it 
without a break in time. Joe's present, however, is here defined by a pattern 
imposed on it as  if it were past, so that he does not, cannot really, anticipate 
the future, except as the reality already possible in, and therefore determined 
by, the present. The only pattern Lena can impose on her past is that  ex- 
pressed in the simpleminded generalization, "My, my, A body does get 
around" (p. 26). But Joe  exists in and is doomed by a pattern imposed before 
it is ever actualized. If for Lena the world is open-ended and creatively 
evolving, for Joe  "his own flesh as well as all space" is a "cage," even though 
it takes him most of his life to  realize this fact (p. 140). 
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Joe's final flight from Jefferson's panting dogs and outraged citizens 
constitutes his most compelling endeavor to  comprehend his own fatality. 
And the resolution for which he struggles is reflected in his partially modifled 
relation to time. At  first he tries "to keep up with the days, after the old 
habit," but before long, "time. . . had . . . lost orderliness," so that the effort 
"to calculate the day of the week" becomes "an actual urgent need" (pp. 290, 
293). Joe  imposes a pattern on pure duration by transforming the "flat 
pattern, going . . . on, myriad, familiar, since all that had ever been was the 
same as all that was to be," into the figure of a "circle" (pp. 246,296). That is, 
having lost his sense of chronoIogical time, Joe  recognizes the shape of the 
"flat pattern" as a circle, which he understands to be "the ring of what I have 
already done and cannot ever undo" (p. 296). Having understood that he 
can never outrun his fate because the relentless succession of day and night 
is already confined and determined by the flat, circular pattern of his life, 
Joe is able to enjoy momentarily "the looking and seeing-which gives him 
peace and unhaste and quiet," the limited repose reflected in his recognition 
that he no longer feels the necessity to eat. It is not the rewarding satisfaction 
of natural hunger which Lena's sardines provide, "not with food," but "with 
the necessity to  eat," previously accommodated frantically by "rotting and 
wormriddled fruit" from which Joe  is now free (p. 292). No longer, then, 
compelled to  support his survival with food, and reconciled momentarily to  
the unrelenting progression of time, Joe  is "hurrying" no  more, but "is like a 
man who knows where he is and where he wants t o  go and how much time 
to the exact minute he has to get there in" (p. 295). Joe  has finally imposed a 
plot on time, a plot which, though it entails doom,  yet provides the conso- 
lation of order and a limited meaning. By connecting the road with time's 
ceaseless progression, and by re-ordering that progression into a circular 
pattern, Joe  has endowed his movement with a directedness which his pre- 
vious flight has not had for him. The meaning he thus discovers allows him 
to relate himself to his world for the first time. For by building a more 
adequate structure for appropriating time's flow, Joe  is allowed a fuller 
understanding of duration and an  accordingly deeper sense of his inescapable 
immersion in it. If, a s  Kermode says, "we perceive a duration only when it is 
organized," then we must form a more comprehensive organization in order 
to perceive a more comprehensible duration (p. 45). Joe's circle goes beyond 
pure chronos but does not redeem it; and his sense of time "going on" reveals 
a partial penetration of duration, but not a total reconciliation with it. 
These are tasks left to the larger structure of the novel, in which Joe's final 
apotheosis is tested as kniios in the light of Gail Hightower's final vision. 
In contrast to  both Joe  and Lena, Gail Hightower comes to  us as a static 
and drooping figure behind a window from which he rarely moves. Re- 
peatedly, our attention is called to  the fact that he "has not moved" (pp. 77, 
80, 277, 339). When Byron begins to  make demands on him, Hightower's 
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sweat, his expression of "shrinking and denial," reflects his reluctance to 
move, to act, to participate in the human struggle which Byl-on's predicament 
represents (pp. 87, 72). Hightower listens to Byron in brooding silence, "not 
offering to help," refusing to accept the obligations and risks entailed in 
Byron's dilemma (p. 264). Hightower's withdrawal, in fact, co~istitutes his 
own peculiar version of flight; he is fleeing the entanglements of life itself. 
He sees the church as a refuge from the world enduring beyond his window, 
from the "harsh gale of living and dying" (p. 419). As a youth the "hot still 
rich maculate smell of the earth" had both attracted and terrified him, but 
the terror overruled the love and he decided to "flee from it, to walls, t o  
[the] artificial light" of the church (p. 278). Hightower's refusal to leave 
Jefferson is paradoxically a kind of f l~gh t  as well, grounded a s  it is not only 
in the rcasons Byron deduces in a revery echoing Hamlet, that a man will 
"cling to trouble he's used to before he'll risk a change," but also in the 
masochistic self-crucifixion in which Hightower masks his refusal to live 
(p. 65). In the face of the grotesque madness of Old Doc Hines, Hightower 
sits stunned "like an awkward beast tricked and befooled of the need for 
flight," filled really with terror and pity at the sight of what is happening in 
"this terrible place," but not yet ready to add himself to that picturc (pp. 
338, 275). As Hightower gradually allows himself to be drawn into the 
drama Byron has been recounting, we see the tension between structured 
and durational time playing a significant role in defining his dilemnia and 
his failed attempts to resolve it. 
Hightower's life, once he is "Done Damned in Jefferson," is really divided 
between those moments of "green suspension" between twilight and dark 
in which he relives the instant of his grandfather's death, and the careless 
disorder of his daily existence in which he seems to "eat like an  animal," 
emitting the "smell of unwashed flesh" and moving amidst crumbs and 
dirt (pp. 52, 410, 56, 261). This duality is reflected in a face "at once gaunt 
and flabby. , . as though there were two faces, one imposed on the other," 
the soft flabby flesh reflecting the decay of waning years and passing time, 
the "gaunt" alertness reinforcing our sense of a mind still functioning, still 
stl-uggling for orderand meaning (p. 77). Later Byron recognizes this same 
duality in Hightower's appearance, making it look "as though the whole 
marl were fleeing away from the nose which holds invincibly to something 
yet of pride and courage above the sluttishness of vanquishment like a for- 
gotten flag above a ruined fortress" (p. 3 18). But the terms which constitute 
that "pride and courage," and the form which that meaning and order take, 
are indeed curious. 
The temporal structure which Hightower has imposed on his life is 
essentially a series of liniroi whose significance is fundamentally inadequate 
because basically unrelated to the present. Psychologically, Hightower's 
sacred hypostatization of the galloping horses and clashing guns derives 
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from the "phantoms" of his childhood, both living and dead (p, 415). En- 
chanted by Cinthy's tales of his grandfather, a lively and robust man whose 
gleeful and harmless irreverence is coupled with a "delicacy of behavior and 
thought,"' and morbidly fascinated with the poss~bilities implicit in the 
blue patch on his father's old Confederate jacket, Hightower fuses and 
heightens the heroic dimensions of both men into the absurdly heroic 
incident, the famous chicken-coop disaster, which he sees as an emblem of 
"that fine shape of eternal youth and virginal desire which makes heroes" 
(pp. 413, 423). Faulkner is here alluding again to Keats's "virginal pant," 
but in arather complex way. Hightower's temporal ordering, indeed fixation, 
is rooted in the assumption that the present represents a falling off from the 
past. This notion is reflected not only in the content of Hightower's repeatedly 
enacted instant with its Keatsiatl emphasis on "eternal youth" as opposed 
to consummated passion, but in its relation to the present world of approach- 
ing Fall as  well. And yet both the content and relation to  the present of 
Hightower's instant are absurd; his grandfather is shot with a "fowling piece" 
for chicken theft-an utterly meaningless event in the context of the war 
itself. Despite Hightower's concerted endeavor t o  raise the incident t o  a 
heroic level, he can only make it more absurd, thinking "any soldier can be 
killed by the enemy in the heat of battle, by a weapon approved by the 
arbiters and rulemakers of warfare. . . . But not with a shotgun, a fowling 
piece, in a henhouse" (p. 425). Of course, it is hard to believe there is no 
irony here, to believe that Hightower is not a t  least minimally aware of this 
absurdity. If he were not, he would resemble Doc Hines, whose structure 
has swallowed him up into a state of sheer madness. But until Hightower 
recognizes the futility of living in this instant, he re-enacts it every evening 
at twilight, not only because it punctuates and informs his existence with 
its own meaning, but also because it must continually be relived if it is to  
offer even that limited significance to his life. Acting to halt change, to 
catch and preserve a single moment from the ceaseless progression of time, 
Hightower's kniros must keep on halting it because change persists. Funda- 
mentally severed by its very meaning from the flow of duration, Hightower's 
kuiros cannot disperse its meaning beyond itself, and so  must be repeated 
indefinitely. 
However, the moment and setting in which Hightower chooses to perform 
this almost sacred ritual relates it tenuously to the world of change. From 
beyond his window, Hightower constantly hears the "myriad" sounds of 
insects, the same echo of life persisting that we noted in relation to  Joe  
Christmas (p. 79). And while the instant functions as a kind of momentary 
stay against the confusion of night, it nonetheless interpolates itseIf into the 
natural world of duration in which dark and light follow each other, chang- 
ing continuously and imperceptibly. While Hightower is not as unaware of 
change and process as is Joe, he still views it with real horror as the endless 
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duration in which "man performs, engenders, so much more than he can or 
should have to  bear" (p. 262). It is only after delivering Lena's baby that 
Hightower is able to relate himself positively to the earth's duration: "the 
intermittent sun, the heat, . . . the savage and fecund odor of the earth, the 
woods. . . . the treble shouts of the generations" (pp, 356, 357). Unable to 
repress his own exuberance, Hightower sees Lena as an  emblem of "the 
good stock peopling in tranquil obedience to it the good earth" (p. 356). 
Hightower feels, apparently for the first time, the perpetual boon of duration, 
the exfoliating and self-renewing fecundity of life, just as Joe  was able 
momentarily to  sense the "shape and feel" of the land across which he had 
been running (p. 295). 
But it is not until Hightower's final revery that the full force of the tension 
between the world of duration and the structure by which it is patterned and 
controlled is felt. Here, Hightower comes to see that the "shelter" which he 
sought in the church was really the shelter of a tomb (p. 419). Keats's 
"classic and serene vase" is brought forth one last time for redefinition, this 
time to reinforce our sense that Hightower's appropriation of a defunct 
meaning is a refuge from the passing of time, forming for  him "safe walls 
within which the hampered and garmentworried spirit could learn anew 
serenity to  contemplate without horror or alarm its own nakedness" (p. 419). 
The urge for order is so strong that Hightower clings to his vision of the 
galloping horses a t  the same time that he admits it may be Cinthy's inven- 
tion: "And if Cinthy did [invent the incident], 1 still believe," he says, 
"Because even fact cannot stand with it" (p. 424). As he leans forward in 
rapt attentiveness at the realizations about to  unfold before him in a kind of 
epiphany, Hightower recognizes the division in his life reflected in "the two 
instants about to touch: the one which is the sum of his life, which renews 
itself between each dark and dusk, and the suspended instant out of which 
the soon will presently begin," the discrepancy between the constant process 
which sustains all life in pure duration and the inadequate pattern imposed 
on that duration by the re-enacted instant, whose approach is heralded each 
evening by the whispered "Now, soon . .  . soon, now" (pp. 426,52). 
Hightower's vision constitutes the novel's most concerted attempt to 
create a meaning adequate to man's needs. The "wheel of thinking" which 
becomes a "halo" is the complex vehicle for a metaphor whose tenor includes 
"all the faces which he has ever seen" (pp. 428, 430). As wheel, the vehicle 
moves incessantly; as halo it appears to  be static. The metaphor forms the 
culmination of all the novel's images of motion and stasis-Lena on the urn, 
the numerous "corridors" through which people move, the "equestrian 
statue" formed by Joe  and his stumbling horse, McEachern poised for the 
kill, the trains and wagons seen in the distance.I0 Having realized that he 
has been "a single instant of darkness in which a horse galloped and a gun 
crashed," and therefore has been totally enthralled by a radically limited 
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structure his commitment to  which has severed him from the constant 
change which sustains life itself so that he has "not even been clay," High- 
tower enacts the novel's most ambitious single effort for a structure which 
will accommodate man's need for meaning without ignoring o r  defiling 
duration itself (p. 430). Yet the faces of Joe  Christmas and Percy Grimm 
still "seem to strive" with one another, "not of themselves striving o r  desiring 
i t .  . . but because of the motion and desire of the wheel itself' (p. 430). S o  
the wheel turns relentlessly, oblivious to man's needs and desires, never fully 
affording the peace for which he struggles. S o  the wheel too, and the vision 
embodying it, fail to inform duration with meaning, to redeem man by 
imposing a comprehensive structure on time. Defeated, Hightower hears 
"the lost and unheeded crying of all the living who ever lived, wailing still 
like lost children among the cold and terrible stars" (p. 43 1). He understands 
that duration implies continuity, that the living and the dead are indis- 
solubly linked by their immersion in the flow of time, but he  fails to impose 
a plot on that flow which will redeem their suffering and stop their crying, 
changing the alien and "terrible" heavens into an  image not of incompre- 
hensible duration but of comprehensive order (p. 43 1 ) .  Accordingly, High- 
tower is left with only his phantoms, "the wiId bugles and the clashing 
sabres and the dying thunder of hooves," and we are left with an  image of 
his figure still in the window brooding in profound despair a t  the sight of 
"poor man, poor mankind" caught as it is between its longing for peace and 
its search for meaning (pp. 432,87). 
Hightower's vision symbolizes the larger task of the novel as a whole, 
which struggles to fulfill the need for a structure sufficiently resilient to  
appropriate the ceaseless flow of time into an ordered "fiction" within which 
man can find meaning. The most obvious feature of this struggle is implicit 
in the relationship the novel creates between past and present. That is, from 
the moment we encounter Lena sitting in the ditch to  the final moment in 
which the furniture salesman relates his comic story to his wife, time pushes 
forward, seeming never to stop despite the lengthy flashbacks into the past, 
Faulkner's technique is something like montage, the cinematographical 
insertion of flashbacks into the progression of the frames which creates a 
sense of a perpetual present. But montage only suggests the way in which 
Faulkner sustains our  feeling of time's uninterrupted motion. For  Faulkner's 
medium is language, not film, and while montage describes his technique, it 
does not explain it. More helpful to  an  understanding of Faulkner's means 
of modulating into the past without violating the flow of the present is 
Bergson's notion of memory as automatically preservative. The paragraph 
leading into Joe's history, which constitutes the longest foray into the past 
if not the deepest penetration of it, works primarily on the principle that 
memory is not a system of pigeonholes, but simply a part of the flow of our 
consciousness, our "attention to life" from which we are artificially alienated 
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by virtue of lost interest. Accordingly, "memory believes before knowing 
remembers," because memory represents that intuitive awareness, that 
"attention to life," which never wanes but is only interrupted, so that "know- 
ing," intelligence, must "remember," must search for and select those 
moments from the past which it deems relevant to the present (p. 104). 
"Memory . . . believes longer than recollects, longer than knowing even 
wonders," and so  represents a sustained subterranean flow, fundamentally 
unaffectcd by the interruptions imposed from above by the contingencies 
of survival (p. 104). Accordingly, Faulkner modulates into the  past without 
interrupting the flow of the present by referring his shift t o  a dimension 
which includes both past and present within the ceaseless flux of duration. 
He not only introduces the shift in this way, but repeats his appeal to memory 
as a n  enduring aspect of the present like a refrain throughout the following 
chapters, reinforcing our  sense of the fundamental continuity of time." 
Consequently, as the present of the novel flows on, we move simultaneously 
deeper and deeper into the past until, with Hightower's revery, we reach a 
point before the Civil War with Hightower's grandfather. Moving further 
into the past, the novel appropriates larger and larger chunks of time into a 
structi~rc which is constantly struggling to enfold them in its accumulating 
meaning. The effort to circumscribe more and more of time's flow within 
an increasing interval is founded on  the principle that we can come to terms 
with duration only as it is ordered withinan interval. 
The novel not only operates on  this structural principle but calls attention 
to it by deliberately biting off more than it seems able t o  chew. By imposing 
not one but three plots on a n  interval of duration which accordingly spreads 
out laterally in the present and vertically into the past, the novel sets itself 
a n  enormous task of assimilation which forms, however, the necessary 
structural base for its larger thematic concerns. As the structure informs 
more and Inore of duration with meaning by circumscribing it within an  
ordered whole, that order is continually revealing itself as inadequate to the 
iarger demands for meaning posed by the continually expanding duration 
against which it is set. Thus there is a constant tension in the novel between 
time's ceaseless motion and man's attempts to impose a structure large 
enough to give that motion a meaning, to humanize it. The repeated a l lus~on 
to Keats and the cumulative refinements and redefinitions of the urn reflect 
the constantly renewed attempt to  create meaning which just as constantly 
fails, but seems to fail in increasingly important, because progressively more 
energetic ways. 
1 have tried to provide evidence of this tension as it makes itself felt in the 
novel's major characters, whose predicaments are reflected at least partially 
by their inability to define a satisfactorily meaningful relationship to pure 
duration. But the individual attempts to accomn~odate  ceaseless change 
punctuate the larger struggle which the novel as a whole enacts. Light i r ~  
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Aug~ar is thematically informed by the vision of a radically diminished 
world, a vision cumulatively reinforced by that recurring moment of lam- 
bency "when a11 light has failed out of the sky and it would be night save 
for that faint light which daygranaried leaf and grass blade reluctant suspire, 
making still a little light o n  earth though night itself has come" (pp. 51-52). 
This world is diminished not because it has ceased to grow and change, as 
the constant buzz of the insects always associated with this lambent moment 
remind us, but because of the lack of ordered meaning available to  its 
inhabitants. The townspeople of Jefferson form a community devoted not 
to life, but to death, by virtue of their commitment to  the rigid distinctions, 
both literal and figurative, of black and white." The church's meaning has 
been relegated t o  a realm analogous to the Platonic Ideal, severed from the 
pulsing flow of life and consequently emptied of human relevance. For the 
church is a failure not because of the "outward groping of those within it 
nor the inward groping of those without," but because of the barriers which 
make that groping necessary, the walls it has erected against change in its 
dogmatic hardening and consequent distortion of the "truth" (pp. 426, 427). 
Those within are unsatisfied with the limited meaning afforded by the 
church's rigid structure, but those without lack even that structure, and so 
exist in the uncertain contingencies of duration. "The professionals who 
control" the church have "removed the bells from its steeples," severing its 
relations with the real world of durational time, and thus rendering inade- 
quate the structure of meaning, the "truth," whose vitality depends on its 
capacity to  inform pure duration, the sheer ongoing process of meaningless 
change with "that peace in which to sin and be forgiven . . . is the life of 
man" (pp. 426-427). The church's "truth" is the paradigmatic fiction, consti- 
tuting a n  organization of time in which a kait.os allegedly fills all time 
before and since with meaning and thus redeems history by providing man 
with a place in it. But the church, having defiled that organization by 
severing it from the duration which it was its purpose to order and redeem, 
now emerges as itself "without order," simply another feature of the "endless 
. . . empty . . . bleak" terrain of unstructured duration, an  institution now 
"sy~nbolical" not of the "ecstasy or passion" it was designed to offer, but of 
"adjurat~on, threat, and doom" (p. 426). 
The novel enacts a struggle for a form which will compensate for the lack 
of coherent meaning that constitutes its diminishment. And while it fails to 
find that form, fails adequately to impose a plot o n  duration which will 
humanize it, the struggle itself emerges as an exercise in redemption. That 
is, if Lena Grove's tranquil obedience to the earth fails to offer a meaning 
for the horror embodied in a diminished world, and Joe  Christmas's circum- 
scr~ption of his life within the coherent pattern of fatalism fails to  redeem 
that life, and if Gail Hightower's tragic vision of the human community as 
continuous and whole fails to provide a kairos sufficiently ample compre- 
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hensively to order the sheer clzronos of life, the cumulative effort which 
each and all represent reflects the ongoing struggle for meaningful form 
which the novel itself enacts. Finally, the tension between endless duration 
and the human endeavor to impose a plot, a redemptive order on that flux, 
persists unresoIved and unalleviated. The  novel as  a whole seeks to  redeem 
a diminished world by making of Joe Christmas's death a kairos for which 
Hightower's vision can supply a context and reference, but fails ultimately 
because that world keeps on moving, The distancing effected by telling the 
final episode in Lena's story and the final chapter of the novel through a 
new character, the furniture salesman, serves to reinforce the sense of time's 
incessant onward progression. Lena Grove's story acts as both bracket and 
ellipsis, to enclose and relieve the tragedy of Joe  Christmas, and to  extend 
and heighten its intensity. By virtue of her health, her fundamental com- 
munality, and the sheer humor of her simple responses to life, she acts as 
comic relief to an intensely horrifying drama. But by virtue of the persistent 
and endless motion she comes to embody, her story extends and amplifies 
the tragedy it circumscribes. For, as Hightower realizes, it is the very 
endlessness of time itself, its unrelenting onward movement, which forces 
man to keep on bearing the pain of living without being able to  find re- 
demption. 
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